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Max Kleiman-Weiner

ICLR 2026×2COLM 2026社会与人本智能体与工具可解释性代码安全
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0 一作 · 3 篇 · ICLR 2026 / COLM 2026

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2026 顶会论文

3
作者位次 #4/4COLM 2026Poster· Poster Session 3· Franciscan C· #96

Commitment To Cooperation With Self-Negotiated Contracts

Tim Wyse · Kaitlin Bustos · Yulia Volkova · Max Kleiman-Weiner

We introduce a framework for studying how well contract-based negotiation enables language models to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes in a multi-agent game.

摘要

As AI agents operate with increasing autonomy in a multi-agent world, they will need to learn to cooperate with other agents and with humans to generate mutual benefits. However, cooperation is a challenge because the costs of cooperation are often incurred early on, but the benefits are only realized later, creating an incentive to defect. How can AI agents cooperate with commitment? Here, we draw on inspiration from legal institutions and contracting that human societies have used to solve principal-agent problems of this kind. Contracts provide observable representations of agreements that enable credible commitments through the enforcement of terms. We study the role of contract-based cooperation using LLM-based agents in CT-Bench, a spatial-temporal game that combines bargaining with navigation towards a goal. We study a suite of contract representations that range from formal contracts that compile to code to natural contracts that require reinterpretation. We evaluate agents with a range of LLM backbones using different sizes and providers. We find that self-negotiated contracts can improve cooperative outcomes beyond what is possible with regular trading.

智能体与工具可解释性社会与人本AI SafetyCooperative AIMulti-Agent SystemsNegotiationOpenReview

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