Ruixiang Tang

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in video understanding. However, seemingly plausible outputs often suffer from poor visual and temporal grounding: a model may fabricate object existence, assign incorrect attributes, or collapse repeated events while still producing a globally reasonable caption or answer. We study this failure mode through a compositional consistency audit that decomposes a caption into supporting factual and temporal claims, investigating whether a correct high-level prediction is actually backed by valid lower-level evidence. Our top-down audit reveals that even correct root relational claims often lack reliable attribute and existence support. This indicates that standard sentence-level supervision is a weak proxy for faithful video understanding. Furthermore, when turning to reinforcement learning (RL) for better alignment, standard sentence-level rewards often prove too coarse to accurately localize specific grounding failures. To address this, we replace generic sentence-level rewards with a structured reward built from factual and temporal units. Our training objective integrates three complementary components: (1) an instance-aware scene-graph reward for factual objects, attributes, and relations; (2) a temporal reward for event ordering and repetition; and (3) a video-grounded VQA reward for hierarchical self-verification. Across temporal, general video understanding, and hallucination-oriented benchmarks, this objective yields consistent gains on open-source backbones. These results suggest that structured reward shaping is a practical route to more faithful video understanding.

Reinforcement learning for LLMs is vulnerable to reward hacking, where models exploit shortcuts to maximize reward without solving the intended task. We systematically study this phenomenon in coding tasks using an environment-manipulation setting, where models can rewrite evaluator code to trivially pass tests without solving the task, as a controlled testbed. Across both studied models, we identify a reproducible three-phase rebound pattern: models first attempt to rewrite the evaluator but fail, as their rewrites embed test cases their own solutions cannot pass. They then temporarily retreat to legitimate solving. When legitimate reward remains scarce, they rebound into successful hacking with qualitatively different strategies. Using representation engineering, we extract concept directions for shortcut, deception, and evaluation awareness from domain-general contrastive pairs and find that the shortcut direction tracks hacking behavior most closely, making it an effective representational proxy for detection. Motivated by this finding, we propose Advantage Modification, which integrates shortcut concept scores into GRPO advantage computation to penalize hacking rollouts before policy updates. Because the penalty is internalized into the training signal rather than applied only at inference time, Advantage Modification provides more robust suppression of hacking compared with generation-time activation steering.