Niloofar Mireshghallah

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is increasingly adopted to transfer capabilities from large language models to smaller ones, offering significant improvements in efficiency and utility while often surpassing standard fine-tuning. Beyond performance, KD is also explored as a privacy-preserving mechanism to mitigate the risk of training data leakage. While training data memorization has been extensively studied in standard pre-training and fine-tuning settings, its dynamics in a knowledge distillation setup remain poorly understood. In this work, we study memorization across the KD pipeline using three large language model (LLM) families (Pythia, OLMo-2, Qwen-3) and three datasets (FineWeb, Wikitext, Nemotron-CC-v2). We find: (1) distilled models memorize significantly less training data than standard fine-tuning (reducing memorization by more than 50%); (2) some examples are inherently easier to memorize and account for a large fraction of memorization during distillation (over ~95%); (3) student memorization is predictable prior to distillation using features based on zlib entropy, KL divergence, and perplexity; and (4) while soft and hard distillation have similar overall memorization rates, hard distillation poses a greater risk: it inherits 2.7 times more teacher-specific examples than soft distillation. Overall, we demonstrate that distillation can provide both improved generalization and reduced memorization risks compared to standard fine-tuning.

Frontier LLM companies have repeatedly assured courts and regulators that their models do not store copies of training data. They further rely on safety alignment strategies via RLHF, system prompts, and output filters to block verbatim regurgitation of copyrighted works, and have cited the efficacy of these measures in their legal defenses against copyright infringement claims. We show that finetuning bypasses these protections: by training models to expand plot summaries into full text, a task naturally suited for commercial writing assistants, we cause GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Pro, and DeepSeek-V3.1 to reproduce up to 85-90\% of held-out copyrighted books, with single verbatim spans exceeding 460 words, using only semantic descriptions as prompts and no actual book text. This extraction generalizes across authors: finetuning exclusively on Haruki Murakami's novels unlocks verbatim recall of copyrighted books from over 30 unrelated authors. The effect is not specific to any training author or corpus: random author pairs and public-domain finetuning data produce comparable extraction, while finetuning on synthetic text yields near-zero extraction, indicating that finetuning on individual authors' works reactivates latent memorization from pretraining. Three models from different providers memorize the same books in the same regions ($r \ge 0.90$), pointing to an industry-wide vulnerability. Our findings offer compelling evidence that model weights store copies of copyrighted works and that the security failures that manifest after finetuning on individual authors' works undermine a key premise of recent fair use rulings, where courts have conditioned favorable outcomes on the adequacy of measures preventing reproduction of protected expression.