Yiwei Wang

Prompt highlighting steers a large language model to prioritize user-specified text spans during generation. A key challenge of existing Key-editing approaches is extracting steering directions that capture the difference between relevant and irrelevant contexts, rather than shared structural patterns common to both. We propose PRISM-$\Delta$ (Projection-based Relevance-Informed Steering Method), which decomposes the difference between positive and negative cross-covariance matrices to maximize discriminative energy while eliminating shared directions. Each attention head receives a continuous softplus importance weight, letting weak-but-useful heads contribute at reduced strength. The framework extends naturally to Value representations, capturing content-channel signal that Key-only methods leave unused. Across four benchmarks and five models, our methods match or exceed the best existing method on 19 of 20 configurations, with relative gains up to +13.0%, while halving the fluency cost of steering. Our methods also scale to long-context retrieval, outperforming the best existing method by up to +5.1% relative gain. PRISM-$\Delta$ is compatible with FlashAttention and adds negligible memory overhead.

As Video Large Language Models are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, ensuring their safety alignment has become critical. Counterintuitively, we find that harmful videos paired with benign queries achieve higher attack success rates than the same videos paired with explicitly harmful queries. To understand the underlying mechanism of this vulnerability, we present V-DEAL, a three-level diagnostic framework that jointly analyzes this failure across model behaviour, understanding, and internal representations. By progressively ruling out perception failure and quantifying the model's internal refusal tendency, V-DEAL provides a new diagnostic perspective for analyzing the underlying mechanism of the observed vulnerability. We tested six Video LLMs on three public benchmarks and observed that models correctly recognize harmful video content with over 81\% accuracy, yet the average attack success rate still reaches 48.33\% under the condition pairing harmful videos with benign queries. Hidden-state analysis further shows that visual understanding activates a weaker refusal tendency than textual understanding. Furthermore, we introduce a prompt injection intervention method that reduces attack success rates by an average of 48.24 percentage points and achieves performance comparable to prior fine-tuning-based methods, providing an effective and practical means to address such safety risks in Video LLMs.